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atherine Watkins, a researcher at
RAND Corporation in Santa Monica,
California, set out in 1999 to find a 
community-based agency to collaborate
on a study. Spurred by a conviction that
“we have to conduct efficacy research in
the actual environments where most sub-
stance abuse treatment is delivered,” Watkins
had two objectives: to test an intervention
for substance-abusing patients with co-
occurring mental illness, and to forge a
long-term research-practice partnership.
Jim Gilmore, director of patient serv-
ices at Behavioral Health Services (BHS)
in Los Angeles, had been concerned for
decades that “the substance abuse and
mental health treatment systems both push
away patients with comorbid conditions.
Each believes the other should intervene
first, with the result that these patients
never get the help they need.” Having
made service improvements for dual-
diagnosis patients a primary goal for his
agency, Gilmore saw in Watkins’ proposal
a chance to excite and educate his staff
toward this end. As well, Gilmore saw
research-practice collaboration with 
RAND as an opportunity to “put BHS on
the map” as a place to go for innovative,
science-based substance abuse treatment.
Gilmore and Watkins agreed to join
forces. Their joint project over the next 3
years documented some positive effects
from their intervention and suggested that
it can enhance patient outcomes (Hunter
et al., 2005; Watkins, 2003; Watkins et
al., 2004). Along the way, the partners
encountered the gamut of issues and
dynamics that make research-practice col-
laborative trials rewarding, but also chal-
lenging to execute.
For this article, RAND researchers
and BHS administrators and line staff
shared their experiences with Science &
Practice Perspectives in a series of inter-
views summarizing the advantages of part-
nership as well as the difficulties, the solu-
tions, and the lessons learned.
THE INTERVENTION AND
HYPOTHESIS
Watkins and Gilmore agreed to test an
intervention adapted from a protocol
RAND had used successfully with depressed
patients. Grounded in the Partners in Care
theoretical model (see www.rand.org/health/
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projects/pic for a full description of the
model), the intervention would address
the problems of patients with both sub-
stance abuse and mental illness on three
fronts:
• Staff skills – RAND would train BHS
staff to identify, assess, and work with
patients with co-occurring mental ill-
nesses and to know when to refer them
to the Department of Mental Health
(DMH);
• Patient awareness and activation – The
collaborators would implement three
specialty groups within BHS to teach
patients to monitor their mental health,
to control their own symptoms to the
extent possible, and to seek help when
needed. All study patients would be
asked to participate in a “health and
wellness” general information group,
and patients who reported they had psy-
chiatric problems or were referred by
a counselor could join either a general
“dual diagnosis” group or one focused
specifically on helping patients cope
with depression;
• Access to the wider system of mental health
treatment resources – RAND and BHS
would work to facilitate referral links
with DMH, with regularly scheduled
case conferences to discuss shared patients.
Watkins and her RAND colleagues
hypothesized that their intervention, in
comparison with BHS’s standard prac-
tices, would improve patient outcomes at
the end of treatment and 6 and 12 months
later. RAND’s previous success with a sim-
ilar intervention for patients with depres-
sion was grounds for hope that the hypoth-
esis would prove out, but they also knew
their intervention had two potential draw-
backs.
First, it had many pieces, so the BHS
staff would have a great deal to learn,
implement, and coordinate. Second, any
improvements the intervention produced
would likely be modest in scale. After all,
the researchers reasoned, the BHS staff
had little experience working with co-
occurring disorders. Moreover, even if the
staff did an excellent job, the interven-
tion’s main therapeutic ingredients—
patient awareness and activation—could
go only so far toward resolving long-
standing, deeply embedded problems
of substance abuse and mental illness.
Because the intervention’s anticipated
advantage over treatment as usual was
small to begin with, there was a signifi-
cant chance that weaknesses in imple-
mentation or chance events could wipe
it out—producing an undeserved null
result.
“STRONGEST POSSIBLE DESIGN,
GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES”
When possible, investigators usually will
test a new intervention with a random-
ized controlled trial (RCT), which pro-
vides the best possible evidence that the
intervention being tested, rather than
some unidentified chance factor, is 
the cause of any improved outcomes.
However, logistical considerations ruled
out use of an RCT design for this proj-
ect. The researchers settled instead on a
quasi-experimental design. They would
deliver the intervention at the largest BHS
clinic, located in Gardena, California,
and use BHS clinics in nearby Inglewood
and Wilmington as comparison clinics.  
A concern in this type of study is
that selecting patients for treatment
and control groups nonrandomly—in
this case, assigning them on the basis of
which clinic they attended—leaves open
the possibility that inherent differences
between the groups may affect the out-
come independently of the intervention.
Such differences would threaten the 
study’s internal validity and the researchers’
ability to understand the impact of the
intervention. For example, the patients
in the Gardena clinic, who would receive
the intervention, were more racially 
mixed than patients in the comparison
clinics in Inglewood (roughly half 
African-American and half Hispanic) and
Wilmington (nearly all Hispanic).
Researchers would therefore need to think
carefully about the possibility that racial
differences might be at least partly respon-
sible for any differences they might find
in patient outcomes.  
“We chose the strongest possible
design, given the circumstances,” says
Suzanne Wenzel a principal investigator
on the study. “Of all BHS’s clinics, we
chose for our comparison sites the ones
that were most similar to the Gardena
clinic. We also were vigilant in monitor-
ing what was happening in the clinics at
all times, trying to notice everything that
might happen to affect the study out-
comes.” 
“All in all,” says Sarah Hunter, RAND’s
conductor of qualitative evaluation,“I
don’t think the trial design had a big impact
on our findings. We were able to control
for many of the observed differences across
the clinics in our statistical analysis.”   
PRESENTING THE STUDY TO
THE LINE STAFF
Community clinic staff members gener-
ally have an array of reasons to be enthu-
siastic, cautious, or opposed to invitations
to become involved in research. When
Watkins and Gilmore presented their plans
to the BHS line staff, they encountered
all three reactions.
Yolanda Farley, program director at
the Gardena site, voiced the most com-
mon response—she welcomed the proj-
ect:  “I was really jazzed. Personally I have
always liked the cognitive part of treat-
ment. I also remembered that in 1992 or
’93, Sara [Huish, a counselor at Gardena]
came back from a convention saying, ‘The
face of treatment is getting ready to change.
Mental health is going to be a big part of
it.’ She was right—we have since seen
mental health become a major part of sub-
stance abuse therapy.”
A second staff contingent took the
news cautiously, keying on the fact that
there would be unpaid extra work. At the40 • SCIENCE & PRACTICE PERSPECTIVES—DECEMBER 2005
Gardena clinic, along with recruiting
patients and delivering the intervention,
the staff would assume a hefty burden of
schedule adjustments, meetings, and
recordkeeping.
Counselors at the comparison clin-
ics would incur fewer additions and
disruptions to their normal practice, but
also would receive less professional satis-
faction. Roselva Romero, program direc-
tor at the Inglewood site,  says, “My coun-
selors were disappointed because the
counselors at Gardena would get the train-
ing and do the intervention, while we
only did the screening part.” To get buy-
in from these counselors, the RAND team
promised to train all BHS staff in the
mental health intervention after the study.
A few of the staff rejected the inter-
vention and its goal. “The traditional
concept of substance abuse treatment stig-
matizes mental health,” Farley says. “Some
of our veteran counselors were stuck in
this mindset, and a couple of them
resigned.”
THE PARTNERSHIP:
CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
COMPROMISES
Research-practice collaborators invari-
ably find they have to adapt their com-
munication styles to comprehend each
other. As an example, while researchers
are well accustomed to obtaining infor-
mation and ideas through lectures and
reading, counselors may learn more eas-
ily through demonstration and practice.
In the RAND-BHS study, Watkins reports,
“The staff told us right off they would
rather we change from lectures to more
experiential training, with group discus-
sions and role playing.”
Researchers and clinicians share the
same ultimate goal—helping people over-
come drug abuse and addiction so that
they can lead healthy, productive lives—
but the two groups’ sensibilities and short-
term agendas can diverge or clash. As a
result, BHS staff clinicians sometimes
provided advice that strengthened the
intervention and its implementation. They
also sometimes asserted differences that
required negotiation and compromise.
Where Perspectives Converged:
Training and Design
Early in the staff training phase of the
study, the counselors pointed out to RAND
trainers that the classes they were provid-
ing did not fully reflect the researchers’
own philosophical foundation. Says
Watkins, “The staff said the training was
focused too narrowly on mental health,
that it should truly integrate mental health
and substance abuse issues. They were
absolutely right; after that, our training
got better.”
Drawing on their unequalled famil-
iarity with patients’ views and attitudes,
the BHS counselors contributed improve-
ments to the specialty mental health groups
that were a key part of the intervention.
Watkins says, “We originally called our
self-awareness group for patients ‘Mental
Health 101.’ The counselors told us, ‘You’ll
never get anybody to sign up if you call it
that.’ The substitute name they gave 
us—‘Health and Wellness’—worked much
better. The counselors also helped us 
solve an early problem with this group:
Some clients were saying, ‘This material
doesn’t apply to me,’ and tuning out. The
counselors told us to add sleep and nutri-
tion to the course content, because every
client recognized that good sleep and good
nutritional habits mattered to them.”
Where Perspectives Diverged:
Recruitment Protocols
The protocols for patient recruitment
raised the most numerous and conse-
quential differences between the RAND
researchers and BHS counselors. The
underlying issues were fundamental enough
to potentially affect almost any research-
practice collaborative study (See “Key
Challenges That Arose During the Inter-
ventions: Underlying Issues, Researchers’
Responses, Impacts, and Lessons”).
The RAND team enlisted BHS intake
personnel to recruit patients—a devia-
tion from usual research practice, but one
the researchers felt was necessary. “In tra-
ditional research, investigators hire their
own recruiting staff,” explains Hunter.
“The recruiters’ entire job is to present
the study to every eligible new patient
who enters the clinic. But we wanted our
intervention to be one that BHS could
sustain with their own resources after the
study when we—and our funding—left
the scene. Therefore, their intake staff
needed to be able to present our inter-
vention to the patients along with every-
thing else they do.”
The investigators trained the BHS
intake staff to invite each new patient to
participate in the study. This involved giv-
ing each new patient a “screener” packet
with information on the study and help-
ing willing patients fill out a baseline health
questionnaire and a consent form.
Months later, recruitment lagged far
behind schedule, raising the prospect that
the researchers might not have enough
data to reach any conclusions at all at the
end of the time allocated for the study.
Questioning the staff to learn why so few
patients were signing up, the researchers
discovered three primary concerns.
Inducting Versus Recruiting 
The clinical staff sometimes omitted telling
new patients about the study out of con-
cern that doing so might interfere with
treatment induction. “Clinicians are
employed to get patients into treatment,”
says Patricia Ebener, RAND’s chief data
collector. “They’re willing to go along with
research protocols to a degree, but not
when doing so threatens their prime man-
date. Now, imagine that you have a client
who’s agitated and on the fence about
making the commitment to treatment.
You have managed to keep her from bolt-
ing throughout an hour-long intake process,
and now you’re supposed to ask her to fillSCIENCE AND PRACTICE IN ACTION—RESEARCH-PRACTICE COLLABORATION • 41
out a study questionnaire. You may well
worry that if you do, it’ll be the last straw.
You might very well decide to drop the
screening, rather than add to the risk of
never seeing her again.”
To resolve this issue, the RAND team
agreed to let intake staff introduce the
study and screen at any time during the
intake interview instead of always at the
end, as originally specified. Although this
method might produce a study sample of
patients that was less than ideally repre-
sentative of BHS’s normal population, it
added a valuable element to recruitment:
the counselors’ clinical judgment con-
cerning when clients might be receptive.
Informed Consent: Vagueness Versus
“Honesty”
The BHS intake staff objected to the word-
ing of RAND’s informed consent form.
Some doubted patients could understand
its legalese. As well, Ebener says, “One
group of counselors didn’t like the fact
that the forms presented our study as being
simply about health. They thought we
should tell patients it was about mental
health, that it was dishonest not to do so.”
“Counselors tend to believe that
being honest with oneself is the most essen-
tial step in recovery,” James Morrow, pro-
gram director at the Wilmington site,
comments, “so acting any way other than
completely up-front with patients is the
worst example they can set.”
RAND researchers had minimal
room for compromise on this issue, says
Ebener. “One goal of our study was to see
how well the counselors, once they were
trained, could tell which clients in their
normal case mix had mental health needs.
We wouldn’t be able to find that out if the
recruiters inadvertently changed the mix
by enrolling mostly patients with mental
health problems. That’s what might hap-
pen if they disclosed that the study was
about mental health. Patients who knew
or thought they had mental health issues
might enroll, while others might opt out.
And patients with or without mental health
issues might shy away for fear of the stigma
associated with mental illness.” 
The RAND team explained why the
recruitment pitch had to be vague about
the study’s goals. Hoping they had made
their point, to get recruitment back on
track, they conceded to the counselors the
flexibility to explain the consent form
in their own words. Recruitment improved
after that, but—with counselors present-
ing the study to patients ad lib—the inves-
tigators henceforth felt insecure about
potential bias in their participant pool.
“In my mind, the way the staff pre-
sented the study to new admissions will
always be a question mark,” says Ebener.
“In the future, when we evolve our con-
sent protocols for such studies, we will
pay more attention to the experiences the
counselors have to offer.”
Compensation
At the outset of the study, the RAND team
paid BHS for staff time spent in recruit-
ment. This system of compensation proved
inadequate as an incentive. It also failed
to provide counselors with any guid-
ance on an issue some found vexing: How
hard should they press patients to join the
study?
The investigators had worked out
their compensation system in consulta-
tion with RAND’s institutional review
board (IRB), a committee charged with
overseeing the technical and ethical sound-
ness of the project. When the system did
not work, the team obtained the board’s
permission to modify the pay formula and
give $5 for each screen handed out. The
intake staff would receive the money even
if the patient checked “not interested” on
the cover sheet.
“The modified incentives clearly sig-
naled to the staff that the idea was not to
try to persuade or coerce the client, but
just to present the information and let the
client make up his or her own mind,” says
Ebener. “But the cost was much higher.”
After the major recruitment issues
were resolved, the BHS staff obtained
signed initial questionnaires from 90 per-
cent of new clients. Ultimately, however,
added costs and time expended during
the period of slow recruitment forced the
researchers to drop planned preinterven-
tion data-gathering and a planned 12-
month followup.
COMMUNITY DYNAMISM
The dynamism of community clinic envi-
ronments is the antithesis of the stability
and control investigators enjoy in tradi-
tional research settings. The RAND-BHS
collaborators encountered one very com-
mon problem—high staff turnover—and
others that vividly illustrate the wisdom
of anticipating the unexpected.
Staff Turnover
Staff turnover rates of 50 percent annu-
ally are common in community substance
abuse clinics. BHS proved no exception
to the rule of perpetual staff replacements:
During the RAND-BHS collaboration,
the individuals filling more than half of
the dozen positions with roles in the study
changed, in some cases several times.
“Some counselors left voluntarily,
some involuntarily,” says Gilmore. “There
came a point when we recognized turnover
could have an impact on the study. We
alerted RAND, but there wasn’t much to
say except, ‘Brace yourselves, because it’s
probably going to keep happening.’ We
tried to maximize the use of the contin-
uing staff and ease the new folks into their
study tasks, but there were times, espe-
cially with screening, when we couldn’t
do that.”
“We were constantly training new
staff, which is an expensive proposition,”
says Hunter. “Another consequence was
that, whereas original staff members had
received their training prior to starting to
deliver the intervention, their replace-
ments had to learn the intervention and
perform it at the same time.” With 42 • SCIENCE & PRACTICE PERSPECTIVES—DECEMBER 2005
EVENT
Recruitment fell behind
schedule. 
Trained staff left the 
program.
A comparison clinic insti-
tuted new practices that
duplicated part of the trial
intervention.
The percentage of patients
who were already receiving
mental health care upon
presentation to BHS
increased.
UNDERLYING
ISSUE
Intake staff felt the proto-
col for recruiting patients
into the study might hinder
treatment induction.
Intake staff felt patients
might not understand
informed consent.
Intake staff felt the
informed consent did not
tell patients enough about
the purpose of the study.
With the original compen-
sation plan, counselors
were uncertain how hard
they should press patients
to participate in the study.
Like many community clin-
ics, BHS has turnover rates
approaching 50% annually
among line counselors.
The comparison clinic was
practicing continuous
quality improvement and
responding to encourage-
ment from the county to
enhance services for the
mentally ill. Counselors
may have felt competitive
with those in the interven-
tion clinic.
California’s Proposition 36
mandated the option of
treatment as an alternative
to prison for nonviolent
offenders, many of whom
were linked to mental health
services in the course of
prior institutionalizations.
RESEARCHERS’
RESPONSE 
Relaxed the protocol:
Allowed intake staff to
present the study at any
time during the intake
interview, rather than only
at the end.
Allowed intake staff  to
present informed consent
materials in their own
words.
Explained why the consent
needs to be vague, but con-
ceded enough leeway in
the presentation to make
the intake staff comfort-
able.
Revised the plan to link
compensation to number
of recruitment pitches to
patients, but kept it
delinked from patients’
agreement or refusal to
participate.
Trained incoming staff as
quickly as possible.
Accepted the fait accompli,
believing it would be
unethical to discourage the
comparison clinic staff
from trying to improve
their services.
Accepted the situation.
POTENTIAL IMPACT
ON STUDY RESULT
Less uniformity in presen-
tation of study may have
resulted in recruitment of a
nonrepresentative sample
of patients.
Same as above.
Same as above.
Same as above.
Added study costs and
time requirement. New
staff learned  the interven-
tion and delivered it at the
same time, potentially
reducing its effectiveness.
The study was unable to
show whether or not the
duplicated part of the inter-
vention was effective. The
study’s ability to show that
the entire intervention was
superior to standard care
was reduced. 
Dilution of positive inter-
vention results. The inclu-
sion of patients who
already had a mental
health provider made it dif-
ficult to demonstrate the
advantages of the interven-
tion.
LESSON
Involve staff at all levels in
early planning for study.
Counseling staff are likely
to resist enacting any pro-
tocol that may interfere
with their primary work
goals—in this case, moti-
vating often-ambivalent
drug abusers to enter treat-
ment.
Same as above.
Counselors tend to be pro-
tective of their patients’
interests, and may inter-
pret them in ways different
from researchers.
Same as above. 
Same as above.
Anticipate high staff
turnover; if possible, train
reserve staff in treatment
interventions.
Closely monitor organiza-
tional practices at all par-
ticipating study sites to
avoid unwanted influences
on outcomes. 
Anticipate the unexpected.
KEY CHALLENGES THAT AROSE DURING THE INTERVENTIONS: UNDERLYING ISSUES, RESEARCHERS’
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partially trained counselors delivering the
intervention, the researchers had further
cause to worry that its anticipated mod-
est margin of advantage over treatment as
usual might dwindle to nothing.
Comparison Site Quality
Improvement
In a typical new intervention study in a
traditional research setting, investigators
will establish a “state of the art” standard
for the comparison treatment and stick
to it. During BHS’s collaboration with
RAND, the treatment program’s contin-
uous quality improvement created a prob-
lem for the researchers.
“One day when I visited the
Wilmington comparison site, staff mem-
bers told me they had forged a great rela-
tionship with their local mental health
provider,” recalls Hunter. “They were
exchanging referrals and communicating
with this provider on a regular basis. In
effect, they had duplicated one compo-
nent of our intervention.”
Wilmington’s choice of initiatives,
Gilmore says, was partly in response to
a Los Angeles County policy of encour-
aging substance abuse programs to enhance
services for patients with co-occurring
mental disorders. Hunter believes com-
petitiveness also may have played a role.
“In a double-blind study in a university
research setting,” says Hunter, “the clini-
cians delivering treatment and the research
participants often don’t have any idea
whether they are in the treatment or con-
trol arm.  In our study, though, the peo-
ple in the comparison sites were well aware
that our study was about mental health
and knew they were being compared to
Gardena. They wanted to look good.”
Removing one difference between
the intervention and comparison treat-
ment would make it harder to demon-
strate an advantage for the intervention.
Nevertheless, the researchers could only
accept it. “I made it very clear that clini-
cians in all the clinics were to deliver the
best care they could,” says Watkins.
“Ethically, you can’t say anything else. You
can’t encourage health care providers to
not try to do better for their patients.”
Systemic Tension and Conflict
Investigators working in a university or
teaching hospital usually can count on
cooperation among the entire study team.
In community settings, the interfaces
between professional groups may gener-
ate friction.
Months into the study, Gardena
counselors complained that their liaison
with DMH was not going smoothly.
Consuela Jackson recounts, “We were
working to become better at diagnosing
and assessing clients in need of psychi-
atric treatments. We identified a fair num-
ber of people and referred them to the
DMH. That was part of the intervention,
but it turned out the DMH providers
weren’t keen on opening the door for our
patients.”
“In their own way, I think the DMH
providers have the same problem with
folks with co-occurring disorders that our
folks can have,” says Gilmore. “Each side
thinks the other should deal with these
people first.”
Farley felt that arrogance also con-
tributed to the problem: “Substance abuse
counselors are labeled as paraprofession-
als, mental health people as professionals.
Some DMH personnel were exhibiting the
attitude, ‘How dare you presume to know
this client needs to be referred to us?’”
The RAND team investigated and
discovered that one DMH employee—
unfortunately, the team’s main liaison at
the referral clinic—was the main source
of the difficulty. The partners quickly
established new procedures to work 
around this individual, but some damage
had already been done. While the prob-
lem lasted, poor coordination of care had
reduced the intervention’s potential to
enhance patient outcomes.
Huish says the discord ultimately
cost patients the most: “I felt like we worked
to fight against the stigma of mental ill-
ness, to open our clients’ minds to the
point where they could accept treatment,
and then DMH closed the door on them.”
Proposition 36
Community clinics often have to adapt
their operations quickly and extensively
in response to local, State, and national
policy decisions. During the RAND-BHS
collaboration, California voters approved
a referendum—Proposition 36—that gave
most nonviolent drug-abusing criminal
offenders the option of entering substance
abuse treatment instead of prison. The
impact on the study was substantial.
BHS, like treatment programs
throughout the State, began receiving a
wave of patients with histories of crime
and incarceration. During the course of
their institutionalization, many of these
new clients had been linked to mental
health care.
“One of the goals of our interven-
tion was to increase patients’ use of men-
tal health services,” says Hunter. “Obviously,
it couldn’t do that if patients were already
in treatment. After Proposition 36, about
one in four new BHS patients already had
a mental health provider. That diluted our
chances of demonstrating an advantage
for the intervention.” Working with the
mental health providers in the criminal
justice system was also difficult, as these
providers were geographically dispersed
and did not know about the study.
“Investigators doing research in com-
munity clinics need to be braced for all
kinds of shifts,” says Ebener. “There is a
seasonality to these programs’ operations.
Policies change, funding sources change.
As we found out, even population bases
can change without anyone being able to
predict or control it.”
THE RESULTS: TWO VIEWS
When the RAND team analyzed their
data, they concluded that the Gardena44 • SCIENCE & PRACTICE PERSPECTIVES—DECEMBER 2005
counselors had understood and imple-
mented the intervention well. Based on
interviews at the beginning, midpoint,
and end of the study, supplemented by
examination of patients’ charts, the coun-
selors had clearly improved in some key
respects: For example, they more often
detected patient mental health issues,
addressed these issues in the treatment
plan, and appropriately referred patients
to mental health providers.
The researchers found one statisti-
cally significant indication that their inter-
vention improved patient outcomes: Among
patients in the Gardena clinic with men-
tal health issues, those who had attended
more specialty mental health group ses-
sions reported fewer symptoms and less
drug use 6 months into treatment. 
The data comparing outcomes
between Gardena and the two other clin-
ics were ambiguous: Gardena patients
reported better mental health and drug
abuse outcomes, and they stayed in treat-
ment longer. However, these advantages
were not large enough to demonstrate the
intervention’s superiority with statistical
certainty.
The RAND team also analyzed
whether the patients who received the
intervention engaged in more health-
promoting activities as a result. They found
that over the course of the study, Gardena
patients increased their use of mental
health services and psychiatric medica-
tions more than patients in the compar-
ison clinics. However, despite the inter-
vention’s focus on patient education and
referrals, the difference amounted to only
a statistical trend, not a proof of effect.
The RAND team shared these results
with BHS staff. Not surprisingly, researchers
and clinicians looked at them in some-
what different lights and took away over-
lapping but somewhat contrasting lessons.
The Investigators’ Conclusions
From their data, RAND researchers con-
cluded that their intervention had suc-
cessfully raised the BHS staff’s skills in
treating patients with substance abuse and
mental health issues. They had not, how-
ever, achieved the benefits they had hypoth-
esized.
“Our intervention achieved its first
objective—improving the Gardena staff’s
understanding and responses to patient
mental health issues,” says Watkins. “Those
improvements, if they are large enough,
should lead to better patient outcomes.
Unfortunately, several features of the com-
munity clinic setting undercut our abil-
ity to demonstrate better outcomes. Staff
turnover and other issues made for incon-
sistent implementation. Other events
pared down the differences between the
intervention and comparison treatments
over the course of the study.”
Ultimately, says Watkins, “Our inter-
vention’s main benefit turned out to be
something we didn’t originally concep-
tualize as one of its goals:  Participating
BHS staff began to think more like health
care professionals. Instead of saying, ‘I
recovered this way, so that’s how my patients
have to recover, too,’ they learned to elicit
objective information and use it to gen-
erate patient-specific treatment plans. For
example, they performed mental status
exams and considered which BHS inter-
ventions would best fit each patient’s men-
tal health and substance abuse symptoms.
“This cultural change is incredibly
important to move substance abuse treat-
ment forward. It was already under way
at BHS, but the intervention greatly accel-
erated it.”
The Clinicians’ Conclusions
The Gardena staff came away from the
study convinced that the intervention
markedly improved patients’ progress in
recovery. Huish expresses the general feel-
ing: “With this intervention, I saw peo-
ple staying longer and becoming stable
while taking medication. We saw clients
improving in their cognition to where
they could start to comprehend the goals
and objectives of their treatment plans.
Progress occurs, I believe, when a per-
son improves his or her way of thinking,
when hallucinations become less intru-
sive, when people are less tied up with
their psychiatric symptoms.”
“The staff members were surprised
when RAND showed them the results of
the data analysis,” says Gilmore. “Their
reaction was, ‘How can this be?  We know
our clients are getting better.’ We’ve been
having discussions to try to explain it.”
One proposed explanation echoes
the RAND team’s surmise that flaws in
implementing the intervention diluted its
efficacy. “The Gardena staff feel their
clients’ progress didn’t show up because
we started collecting data before they got
good at performing the intervention,” says
Hunter. “They feel the data don’t reflect
their current practices, and that the inter-
vention is now working. I think there’s
probably some truth to that.”
BHS staff members also suggested
that outcome measures different from
those used in the study might have been
better suited to capturing patients’ progress.
For example, based on their clinical expe-
rience, the counselors questioned the
researchers’ use of a global question about
patients’ quality of life. “Patients gener-
ally said their quality of life hadn’t improved,
but I think that is to be expected from
addicted patients in early recovery,” says
Shirley Summers, head of clinical services
at BHS. “Patients are clean and sober, but
not used to it. Even though objectively
their lives may be better—they may have
a job and a car, their relationship may
be back together—they’re probably still
going to feel uncomfortable just being in
their own skin.” The staff suggested that
the quality of patients’ participation in
therapy might provide the best indica-
tor of their progress in early treatment.
GAINS AND FUTURE OF THE
COLLABORATION
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cussions about their next collaboration.
“From the beginning, this study was part
of a larger project to build a partnership
with BHS for the long run,” says Watkins.
“We anticipate that the collaboration will
grow easier with each new joint endeavor.”
The next collaboration will proba-
bly also focus on mental health and drug
abuse comorbidity. Gilmore says gains
from the first project will enable the part-
ners to start the next one further along:
“Treating co-occurring disorders is now
the standard at BHS. As a result of the
study, our counselors are more aware of
these patients, and they have more tools
to help them. The research also verified
how important it is to do this:  Around
half the folks who walk through the door
at Gardena have more than one disorder.
Now that we are more attuned, we are also
finding that often, once someone’s sub-
stance abuse clears a little bit, it becomes
very apparent that he or she has a co-
occurring disorder.”
The staff in all three participating
BHS clinics expressed enthusiasm about
the study already done and the ones to
come. “It was a lot of work, but time well
spent,” Jackson says. “The experience
boosted my confidence and effectiveness
with clients who come into treatment with
multiple histories. I had learned about
dual diagnosis in school, but RAND’s
training was more extensive. I had prior
experience with cognitive-behavioral ther-
apy, but it was nothing like working along-
side the RAND psychologist.”
In their next try, Watkins will apply
the major lessons taken home by the RAND
team: “Community-based research designs
must be extra hardy. In future studies, we
will field an intervention and recruit a
sample large enough to absorb more of
the dynamics of community environments
and still show changes in outcomes. We
won’t start evaluating the intervention as
soon as we put it in place, as our funding
timeline forced us to do here. Instead, 
ideally, we’ll take 6 months to pilot-test
the intervention with the staff, get their
feedback, and work out the kinks.
“Community-based research is dif-
ficult—it takes a long time, and it can be
costly, but we must do it. There is only so
much we can learn about treatment effec-
tiveness in laboratory and university
settings.”
SUMMARY AND LESSONS
In this research-practice collaborative
study, RAND researchers and BHS com-
munity treatment providers complemented
and challenged each other. The researchers
fielded a better intervention thanks to the
counselors’ input, and the counselors
gained skills in identifying and assisting
patients with co-occurring mental health
disorders. 
The partners encountered many chal-
lenges. Some arose because of the some-
what conflicting goals of research and
treatment: For example, the researchers
wanted clinicians to always present the
study to new patients at the end of the
intake interview, while the counselors
wanted to present it when their clinical
sense told them doing so would not inter-
fere with treatment induction. Both posi-
tions had important practical rationales:
Researchers try to eliminate differences
between patients’ experiences that can bias
study results, while clinicians seek to estab-
lish a therapeutic relationship with each
patient on an individual basis. Although
negotiating differences may never be sim-
ple when such fundamental principles
come into play, the partners learned that
it’s vital to engage all levels of participat-
ing staff very early in the planning of a
study.
A second set of issues reflected changes
within the community treatment envi-
ronment. These varied in their degree
of predictability—for example, the RAND-
BHS partners can anticipate that coun-
seling staff turnover is likely to be high
in future studies they undertake together,
but systemic changes on the order of
California’s implementation of Proposition
36 are likely to always have impacts that
are very hard to foresee. The takeaway les-
sons from these experiences are the need
to be alert to changing situations through-
out the planning and conduct of studies
and the advisability, if possible, of build-
ing in reserve capacity—in staff training,
time, funding, and statistical power rel-
ative to the anticipated effectiveness of
the intervention being tested.
RAND and BHS conceived of this
study as the initial project in a long-term
partnership. Thanks to the lessons learned
from their first experience, the partners
will start their next project—already in
planning—further forward. RAND
researchers will incorporate an expanded
awareness of the community treatment
culture and environment. BHS counsel-
ing staff, say all concerned, will start the
next project with a more scientific out-
look, marked by a new level of commit-
ment to evidence-based clinical deci-
sionmaking. &
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